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After the Avalance: The Post-Snowden 
Intelligence Politics between the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany
Jobel Kyle P. Vecino
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
The revelations of PRISM and XKeyscore by ex-National Security Agency (NSA) 
analyst Edward Snowden resulted in arguably the largest intelligence leak so far in the 
21st century. The leak revealed that the NSA was working with the British Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) on surveillance and data collection of individuals 
throughout Europe. Similarly, the NSA also colluded with the German Federal Intelligence 
Service (BND) on similar data collection and surveillance activities. Whereas the British 
government reacted relatively benignly to the revelations despite cries of government abuse, 
the German government reacted negatively to the revelations, eventually opening a rift be-
tween Washington and Berlin. This paper examines the reactions to and the immediate po-
litical consequences of the Snowden revelations within the United Kingdom and Germany. 
By comparing and contrasting the two cases, one can determine whether the United States 
unnecessarily antagonized the Germans or if larger forces were at work.
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One year after Edward Snowden first leaked information surrounding the United 
States National Security Agency’s (NSA) data collection programs, German authori-
ties arrested an employee of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), Germany’s foreign 
intelligence and security service, on the charge of conducting espionage on behalf of the 
United States (Larimer, 2014). The episode sparked wide domestic rebuke of American 
intelligence activities within Germany. One week later, broadcaster Deutsche Welle aired 
an episode of international talk show Quadriga that discussed the growing political divide 
between the United States and Germany over espionage and intelligence gathering. The 
arrest was only the latest in a string of espionage exposés regarding American intelligence 
gathering within Germany, all of which contributed to growing anti-American sentiment 
amongst both German politicians and public alike. Referring to German political out-
rage against the United States over the discovered agent, Tom Goeller, former German 
correspondent for the Washington Times, said “[the] problem is very simple: the German 
nation, the public wasn’t aware, they didn’t know. But the politicians knew, the diplomats 
knew, and this is why I do not understand the outrage of German politicians” (Goeller, 
2014). Expectedly, the public reacted negatively to the spy, but the German officials’ 
sharp condemnation of what seemed a common and expected act of espionage illumi-
nated a long saga of political toxicity regarding American intelligence gathering within the 
Germany, regardless of whether the German government itself was implicated in some of 
those activities.
Germany was not the only state involved in the initial surveillance revelations. Other 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, including the United Kingdom 
and France, were also subject data-gathering and surveillance programs run by the NSA. 
Government intelligence agencies within both the United Kingdom and Germany were 
complicit in NSA data-gathering and surveillance activities on their respective homelands. 
As James Igoe Walsh aptly notes, the “sharing of intelligence between national govern-
ments is at the centre of their attempts to cooperate on contemporary problems such as 
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and stopping the activities of 
terrorist groups and drug traffickers” (Walsh, 2007, p. 151). Therefore it seems reasonable 
that the German and British governments would willingly work together with the United 
States on intelligence gathering in order to curtail threats.
However, once the information was leaked, the political responses from both 
countries’ governments differed greatly: while the British government accepted complic-
ity and defended the programs, the German government denied complicity and even-
tually attacked the programs. Hence, a conundrum arises: an explanation must exist to 
explain why despite German and British intelligence agencies’ enthusiastic compliance 
with American intelligence, the former’s government condemned the United States for 
conducting those operations once they were revealed, whereas the latter did not. This 
paper delves into this dilemma by outlining the background surrounding British-American 
and German-American intelligence relationships and analyzing the political effects to those 
relationships post-Snowden. A comparison of these two analyses will hopefully illuminate 
whether there are lessons to be learned regarding intelligence gathering and surveillance 
within allied states. It will also seek to answer whether the United States should take the 
supposed strain on American-German relations seriously or if this is a case of one eagle at-
tempting to scare another from the former’s nest.
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Building the Snowpack
To provide a reference point with which one may compare the German-American 
intelligence relationship to, there is none better than to compare than the British-Ameri-
can intelligence relationship. The British-American intelligence partnership dates back to 
the World War I era, but an explicit partnership was established post-World War II and 
continues to the present day, making it the most stable bilateral intelligence partnership in 
history. The relationship is also well-documented, making it a rarity among intelligence 
partnerships, as the very nature of such partnerships precludes secrecy. Intelligence, as 
used here, is defined as “linked to the production and dissemination of information” and 
“performed by officers of the state for state purposes” (Warner, 2002, p. 21). Specifically, 
it is important to look at signals intelligence (SIGINT) collaboration, as SIGINT is most 
identified with communications, data collection, and data surveillance, and the agencies 
responsible for SIGINT, the NSA and the United Kingdom’s Government Communica-
tions Headquarters (GCHQ), are the two agencies that are at the center of the Snowden 
leaks.
The NSA and GCHQ began their formal partnership after their two respective states 
forged the United Kingdom-United States of America Agreement (UKUSA), the first 
framework sanctioning official communications intelligence exchange approved on March 
5, 1946 (United States Government; United Kingdom Government, 1946). The agree-
ment allowed for free exchange of foreign communications between the two nations, 
which in turn meant that the two nations also shared decryption tools and processes (Al-
drich, 2001, p. 246). Once the NSA was created by President Harry Truman, it became 
the go-to agency for American SIGINT, working together closely with GCHQ to moni-
tor the Soviet Union (Aldrich, 2010, p. 104). UKUSA was later expanded to include the 
participation of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand during the early years of the Cold 
War, forming the intelligence-sharing network known as the Five Eyes (The National 
Archives, 2010).
GCHQ and the NSA continued to work intimately on various projects into the 
twenty-first century, many of which were revealed by Snowden. The two agencies fought 
privacy measures such as public key encryption in order to maintain a strong surveillance 
presence into the Internet age (Aldrich, 2010, p. 489). Despite losing that battle, the two 
agencies found ways of circumventing the encryption problem through backdoor chan-
nels on software with the cooperation of private firms (Ball, 2013). GCHQ also operated 
a project known as “Mastering the Internet” which involved a subproject called Tem-
pora, involving intercepting data as it entered England through fiber-optic cables running 
underwater at areas such as Cornwall. GCHQ analyzed the data collected here and also 
passed on information to NSA for analysis (MacAskill, Borger, Hopkins, Davies, & Ball, 
2013). Monetary support between the United States and the United Kingdom also oc-
curred; from 2010 to 2013, the United States government paid at minimum 100 million 
pounds to the British government with the intent to modernize and expand GCHQ’s data 
collection capabilities (Hopkins & Borger, 2013). These are but some of the many in-
stances that show how close the GCHQ-NSA relationship, and by extension, the British-
American intelligence relationship remains. Similar instances could be also found between 
the BND and American intelligence agencies.
The BND and the NSA share a hierarchical relationship, often characterized as one 
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between a younger sibling and an older sibling (Livingston, 2014). During the early stages 
of the Cold War, the Western Allied-controlled portion of Germany was on the frontline. 
Due to the increase of possible hostilities between the former Allies, the land that would 
become West Germany became pivotal for signals intelligence collection to monitor 
Soviet movements. To this end, former German Army intelligence chief Reinhard Gehlen 
formed the Gehlen Organization under the supervision of the United States Army, effec-
tively creating a German intelligence apparatus under the umbrella of the American mili-
tary (Walsh, 2007, p. 169). As the intelligence provided to the Americans from the Gehlen 
organization seemed invaluable, when the time came to divide Germany into two states, 
the United States continued to control the Gehlen Organization through the American 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Walsh, 2007, p. 169). The Gehlen Organization 
would evolve into the BND. In 1962, the BND established a formal SIGINT relationship 
with the NSA (National Security Agency, 2013). By this time, the BND was autonomous 
but continued to remain effectively tied to, though not necessarily overseen, by American 
intelligence agencies.
The elder-sibling/younger-sibling dynamic continued well into the twenty-first 
century, where technological advancements and proximity to the Middle East increased 
the prestige of German signals intelligence operations and made German intelligence a 
particular boon for counterterrorism measures, but the general hierarchical framework 
persisted. After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the United States and Germany 
signed an intelligence sharing agreement that would have the United States provide con-
tact information and other data for German foreign intelligence to use for targeting pur-
poses (Gude, et al., 2014). The agreement specifically allowed the United States to analyze 
data and signals being received by the Bad Aibling listening post in Bavaria (Gude, et al., 
2014). The station, which was originally built by the NSA as a listening post and held 
under joint NSA-BND control for years, was eventually transferred to full BND control, 
but the NSA retained a permanent staff on location (Gude, et al., 2014). The NSA-BND 
partnership itself would become solidified as the Joint SIGINT Activity (JSA) (National 
Security Agency, 2007/2008). In addition, the NSA also provided the Federal Office for 
the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz or BfV), the German 
domestic intelligence office, with the intelligence analysis program XKeyscore (Gude, et 
al., 2014). On the whole, the partnership seemed very warm. To quote one internal NSA 
information paper from 2013, “[In] the past year, Germany displayed both eagerness and 
self-sufficiency in transforming its SIGINT activities and assumed greater risk in support 
of U.S. intelligence needs and efforts to improve information sharing within the German 
government, with coalition partners, and NSA” (National Security Agency, 2013). This 
statement shows that the Americans recognized an eagerness for German involvement 
with NSA SIGINT efforts.
What both these stories illustrate is that British signals intelligence and German for-
eign and domestic intelligence held very strong partnerships with the NSA. Both GCHQ 
and the BND have a history of partnership that dates back decades and that the NSA had 
particularly strong influence in the operation of both agencies. Considering the ensuing 
political aftermath of the Snowden leaks, both agencies’ respective governments would 
fight tooth and nail to defend their past actions, particularly as they both retained ultimate 
oversight over those agencies. Surprisingly, that was not what happened.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2016/iss1/8
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Watching the Snowslip
The leaks first became public in early June 2013, early on implicating and enrag-
ing the British government. One day after the leaks, the British newspaper The Guardian 
published an article claiming that GCHQ was collecting intelligence from large Internet 
firms through the NSA-built PRISM program. GCHQ refused to comment regarding the 
program. In the following weeks, The Guardian and The Washington Post continued pub-
lishing information about the joint surveillance and data collection activities, prompting 
the British government to contact The Guardian to request that the leaks stop (Van Sickle, 
2014). The government’s response soon turned indignant. British Prime Minister David 
Cameron remarked that what “Snowden is doing and to an extent what the newspapers 
are doing in helping him is frankly signaling to people who mean to do us harm, how to 
evade and avoid intelligence and surveillance and other techniques” (Hope & Waterfield, 
2013). A member of British parliament called for the editor of The Guardian, Alan Rus-
bridger, to face criminal prosecution over publishing the leaks (Mason, 2013). It was quite 
clear that the British government would not back down on its defense of the programs.
On the continent, the BND became implicated once the German newsmagazine 
Der Spiegel got hold of documents pertaining to German-American intelligence liaison. 
One month after the initial leaks Der Spiegel published articles claiming that the BND 
conducted surveillance and data collection on behalf of the NSA, sending data on German 
residents to the Americans (Gude, et al., 2014). The files obtained by Snowden were then 
released for public download by Der Spiegel, fueling the growing fire of blame under-
neath the Chancellery, as it maintains oversight and responsibility over the nation’s federal 
intelligence agencies. The leader of the German parliamentary opposition at the time, the 
Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) Peer Steinbrück accused Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
the incumbent government of blatantly lying to the public, stating that the “latest media 
reports about the close relationship between German and American intelligence services 
confirm the impression that the German government either feigned ignorance, kept quiet 
about its complicity or that the intelligence agencies have gotten out of control” (Medick, 
2013). Accusations of the government watering down German basic law followed, with 
constitutional experts questioning the legality of the Chancellery’s complicity (Gude, et 
al., 2014).
For its part, the German government remained relatively quiet about the leaks, 
claiming nescience before being exposed. Before the leaks shed light on German intel-
ligence involvement, the incumbent government made claims that the revealed programs 
were only being discovered through news coverage. Despite claims of possible German 
involvement in the NSA’s PRISM program, the official government response remained 
reserved. Merkel kept a neutral public attitude regarding the leaks, refusing to comment 
until a review of PRISM was completed by the United States, while affirming German 
sovereignty (Der Spiegel, 2013). Once Der Spiegel published the documents Snowden 
leaked pertaining to Germany, criticism against the government mounted. Around the 
same time, high-ranking German intelligence officials received legal affirmation from both 
GCHQ and the NSA that neither organization had acted illegally according to established 
agreements between Germany and the organizations’ respective countries (Gude, Von 
Hammerstein, Hesse, Rosenbach, & Schindler, 2013). With the affirmation of legality, 
it became accepted that the BND was responsible for the bulk data collection (most of 
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which was claimed to originate from Afghanistan), and that appeared to be that.
However, the situation did not go away, and the German government’s attitude 
became increasingly anti-American. Der Spiegel conducted further analysis of the leaked 
NSA documents, finding that Merkel’s cell phone calls were actively intercepted (Ap-
pelbaum, et al., 2013). A parliamentary probe was established to investigate the extent of 
the NSA leaks (The Local, 2014). A federal investigation was opened up over the NSA 
(Gude, Schindler, & Schmid, Merkel’s Mobile: Germany Launches Investigation into 
NSA Spying, 2014). Compounding the wiretapping issue was the discovery and arrest of 
an American mole within the BND. One year after the first published leaks, the German 
government demanded the expulsion of the CIA Berlin station chief (Miller & Kirchner, 
2014). The Washington-Berlin relationship became increasingly tepid. 
American officials understood the necessity of mollifying German unease both 
in public and in the German government to varying success. During President Barack 
Obama’s first speech in Berlin following the Snowden leaks, he dedicated a section of the 
speech assuring the German public that the revealed intelligence gathering and analysis 
programs were bound by “the rule of law, and they’re focused on threats to our security – 
not the communications of ordinary persons” (The White House, 2013). Once allegations 
of eavesdropping on Merkel’s phone calls were confirmed, Secretary of State John Kerry 
made a diversion during a trip to Munich to personally meet with Merkel and German 
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier regarding collaboration issues (Schmitz & Ge-
bauer, 2014). Before Merkel’s visit to the United States in April 2014, Obama and Merkel 
publicly stated that they wished to create a “structured dialogue” which Kerry opened the 
door to during his visit (Blome, Schmitz, & Stark, 2014). However, tensions once again 
rose once the American BND mole was arrested, and the United States bowed to Ger-
many’s order to relieve its Berlin CIA chief.
Digging a Snowpit
The depth and warmth of the British-American and German-American relationships 
have now been established, as well as each nation’s respective SIGINT organization’s com-
plicity in NSA programs revealed by Snowden, therefore leaving open the question of why 
both governments’ responses seemed so contrary. There are several plausible explanations 
as to why the German government reacted very differently than the British government did 
after the leaks. As internal information regarding precise attitudes within the German gov-
ernment remains inaccessible and will likely remain so into the near future, one should not 
be surprised that the veracity of the following explanations cannot be officially confirmed. 
However, some or even all of these factors could contribute to an answer and therefore 
should be considered carefully. The following two sections will focus on political analyses 
on the individual, domestic, and international level to explain as fully as possible the dispar-
ity between the British and German reactions.
A historical perspective is important to consider particularly when analyzing the 
evolution in Merkel’s political responses to the leaks. After World War II was over and 
the German state was separated, West Germany maintained the BfV and BND as their pri-
mary intelligence and security organizations while East Germany had the Stasi. The Stasi 
were well known for their mass surveillance and brutal methods, leaving a lasting legacy 
on the German public, particularly on former East Germans such as Merkel (Chambers, 
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2009). Merkel’s own father operated a seminary, many of which were infiltrated by the 
Stasi to monitor non-communist teachings, and Merkel herself refused to inform on behalf 
of the Stasi while she was seeking a teaching position in her younger years (Crawford & 
Czuczka, 2013). Such past experiences may have made her more amenable to attacking 
the American position on their intelligence gathering activities once it was discovered 
that she was personally targeted. The evidence for this interpretation revolves around the 
change in tone of the Chancellery’s message regarding American surveillance activities 
before and after it was made clear that Merkel’s phone calls were listened in to. Of course, 
similar experiences also likely influenced German public opinion against the United States 
when the extent of the NSA’s operations became known – which allowed Merkel’s politi-
cal rivals to attack her and her party in the 2013 German federal election.
Domestically, it would be fairly easy for an opposition party to criticize an incum-
bent government of sacrificing their citizens’ privacy and human rights to some foreign 
menace (in this case, the Americans). Concurrent to the time of the Snowden leaks, 
Germany underwent a general election campaign fought primarily between Merkel’s 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the opposition SPD. When the leaks came out, 
the SPD jumped at the opportunity to criticize Merkel, due to the Chancellery being the 
body that supervises the intelligence services. The CDU fired back, citing that the SPD 
was in power during the time the first intelligence sharing agreements were forged in 
2002, and that the SPD was also in power during Merkel’s first term as Chancellor (Gude, 
Von Hammstein, Muller, & Schinder, 2013). However, many of the documents leaked 
by Snowden recount the relationship between the BND and the NSA during Merkel’s 
tenure, allowing one to reasonably argue that she was more responsible than her SPD 
counterparts (National Security Agency, 2013). The strict stance against the United States 
occurred after the general election, during which Merkel formed a coalition with her 
political rivals, the SPD, giving them the foreign policy portfolio as well. The Chancel-
lery then undertook a tougher stance on American surveillance and espionage, especially 
after Der Spiegel found that Merkel’s phone calls were intercepted. The coalition govern-
ment also called for the expulsion of the Berlin CIA station chief after arresting an alleged 
American mole within the BND (Miller & Kirchner, 2014).
Such a scenario involving attacks on government complicity was not possible in 
the United Kingdom. By the 2013, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition was 
in power for three years, before which the Labour Party, the leading opposition party, 
was in power for the previous 13 years. This meant that the three largest British politi-
cal parties were all in some way in power during the time period during which the 
programs revealed by Snowden were in place. For example, the presentations regarding 
PRISM include references to the program’s use back to 2007, during which time Labour’s 
Gordon Brown held an absolute majority in Parliament (PRISM Collection Manager, 
2013). Granted, after the Conservative coalition came into power in 2010, there seems 
to have been a shift in focus toward GCHQ activities, shown by government acceptance 
of American funds for expanding GCHQ’s capabilities, possibly signaling greater govern-
ment support over the surveillance and data collection activities enacted by the NSA and 
GCHQ.
On the international level of analysis, Germany’s reactions may be symptomatic of 
a greater power shift. Walsh argues that in the traditional framework of the international 
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state system, despite an anarchic international order, hierarchical intelligence sharing rela-
tionships could be formed if the gains were great enough (Walsh, 2007, p. 177). Also, due 
to the inherent power dynamics of such a relationship, one can easily determine which the 
greater power is and which is the lesser based on their position in an intelligence-sharing 
relationship. Walsh claims that both Germany and the United Kingdom participate as sub-
ordinate partners to the United States with regards to intelligence sharing (Walsh, 2007, 
p. 178). Though his analysis is of relationships from the early Cold War, one can easily 
see parallels today – GCHQ’s funding by the NSA echoes American funding efforts post 
World War II, while the NSA’s construction and joint operation of the Bad Aibling sta-
tion with the BND retains hallmarks of the time the CIA managed the BND’s predeces-
sor. One caveat is that the United Kingdom’s relationship with the United States may also 
be considered more anarchic (or less hierarchical), due to UKUSA allowing either state to 
withhold certain information from the other assuming the latter agrees to nondisclosure 
(Aldrich, 2001, p. 247; Walsh, 2007, p. 178). Either way, the German-American intelli-
gence relationship is undoubtedly hierarchic.
Under this interpretation, Germany’s decision to defect from the agreement may 
indicate that the German state no longer sees itself as belonging within a hierarchical 
relationship with the United States. Evidence for German defiance of American-backed 
policy post-Cold War is well known, including overtures for trade agreements with China 
against American wishes as well as the previously mentioned actions the Germans took 
against American intelligence interests (Kundnani, 2014). These actions come at a time 
where Germany is becoming increasingly seen as the leader of the European Union and 
one of the world’s foremost rising powers (Kundnani, 2014); therefore it seems very likely 
according to liberal institutional theory that Germany no longer sees adequate payoffs 
from a hierarchical relationship. In contrast, the United Kingdom declined internationally 
since World War II, with the forfeiture of several of its colonial possessions. In relation to 
the United States, the United Kingdom took on the role characterized as a partner past 
its prime. Former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan once quipped that “These 
Americans represent the new Roman Empire and we Britons, like the Greeks of old, must 
teach them how to make it go” (Hitchens, 1990, p. 23).
Prima facie the domestic analysis of the situation comes across as the most compel-
ling. Certainly, it is clear that domestic motivations were on the mind of government 
officials, particularly Merkel and her fellow CDU members who were up for reelection 
and required the opposition SPD to form a government post-election. Posing in a more 
anti-American stance during this time could be construed as cut-and-dry political strategy. 
However, the international level analysis of the situation may bear more interesting insight 
into what might be a marked change in American-German relations. Merkel transferred 
the foreign policy portfolio within her new coalition government to the SPD, granting 
the party that most criticized the intelligence-sharing policy of the previous government 
influence over policy in that sector. Furthermore, by continuing to hammer the American 
government and with the resulting American retreat in some intelligence activities, Ger-
many looks more equal with the United States, at least in public perception. These subtle 
shifts do suggest that optic-wise, Germany began to show itself successfully defecting from 
a hierarchical relationship with the United States, and the United States acknowledging 
that the relationship was now less hierarchic.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2016/iss1/8
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Withstanding the Snowstorm
At the very least, the German public’s reaction is understandable considering the lack 
of public consent regarding the activities conducted on them. Former GCHQ head David 
Omand wrote that in some sense the public must maintain confidence in the intelligence 
activities conducted upon them by their government, as these activities are conducted on 
behalf of the individual as well as the state (Omand, 2010, p. 262). It would be a different 
matter if the United States unilaterally conducting espionage and data gathering activities 
(which it did), but the matter at hand concerns the German government’s willingness to 
enter into the data surveillance relationship without legislative review. Such reviews and ac-
countability structures, however effective, do exist in the United Kingdom (Omand, 2010, 
p. 267). Therefore, one could say that in the British case the subjects of the state had their 
say through their representatives. The nature of this issue within Germany is sadly dubious 
without official government records; the Chancellery could have lacked proper control over 
its agencies or it could have been aware of the programs and simply chose not to inform the 
appropriate legislative bodies. Regardless, because some of the domestic political pressure 
against the aforementioned activities, the United States should accept the necessity of some 
of the German government’s moves decrying American intelligence activities.
For the United States, several courses of action remain available. Regarding repairing 
German-American relations, it may be prudent to once again offer Germany membership 
within the Five Eyes or negotiate another, relatively more equitable intelligence-sharing 
agreement. Such a status could appease any German sentiment surrounding escaping the hi-
erarchical intelligence relationship, and would allow the United States full access to German 
foreign SIGINT. The Obama administration rebuked a similar request from Merkel in the 
past while Merkel rebuked offers made to her (Donahue & Walcott, 2014), but stances can 
change and domestic American support for such a decision does exist (Passenheim, 2013). 
Another choice would simply be to wait out the political damage before resuming opera-
tions at as large of a scale pre-Snowden. However, considering both German anger and 
domestic pressure to reform or at least rein in American intelligence agencies, such a tactic 
may cost significant time and opportunities, depending on the value of the SIGINT ob-
tained through BND liaison. Important to note however, is that whatever fuss the German 
government formulated, affirmations of friendship continued, at least in public statements. 
Considering the geopolitical situation at the time regarding the Russian seizure of Crimea 
and the deterioration of the Ukrainian crisis, such affirmations would be political necessity 
to counterbalance against a resurgent Russia.
At first, the lesson from the political fallout of the Snowden leaks and ensuing intel-
ligence scandals seems to be that even intelligence activities, no matter how common or 
well-intentioned, will meet resistance from friends as well. To avoid similar debacles with 
allies in the future, the United States should examine the pretense of equality encapsulated 
within UKUSA and determine whether in the future, the United States will benefit from 
similar relationships with other states like Germany. Whether or not these relationships are 
actually reformed remains a separate matter, but intelligence relationships should be con-
stantly reevaluated to mirror the changing world. There may come a day where the United 
States no longer maintains a dominant intelligence apparatus or reach or maybe that day will 
never come, but to avoid being snowed in politically by future leaks, maintaining strong 
political ties with intelligence partners should be imperative.
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